Q: I was appointed receiver in a health and
safety case, brought by a city, over a rundown motel and an adjacent
rundown office building. The owner of the property, who has been fighting
the city, has now filed an action in federal court against the city
alleging that the city has violated his constitutional rights and is
asking the federal court to set aside the receivership order. Can a
federal court do that?
A: The short answer is no. Federal courts, generally, have no power
to invalidate or set aside state court orders. Federal courts also,
generally, do not have power to review the actions of state courts. State
courts are constitutionally entitled to independence. Relief from a state
court order should come through the state appellate process or, in rare
circumstances, the U.S. Supreme Court. In an unreported case, similar to
yours, Sharma v. City of Redding, 2017 WL 2972263 (E.D. Cal. 2017),
a receiver was appointed in a nuisance abatement proceeding brought by the
city over rundown property. The receiver took possession of the property
and determined that rehabilitation would be cost prohibitive, as would
demolition of the property. The receiver, therefore, obtained court
approval to sell the property “as is” to a willing buyer to enable it to
rehabilitate the property. The owner sued the city in federal court
contending the city’s actions constituted a taking a property without just
compensation, violated procedural due process, violated the owner’s
property rights and violated his constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. The owner also filed a motion seeking to set aside the state
court’s order appointing the receiver as void. In denying that motion, the
district court, as indicated above, found there was no authority for the
proposition that a federal district court could set aside or otherwise
vacate or invalidate an order of a state court in this context. The court
also specifically found, because the action by the city was taken in an
enforcement context, to enforce public nuisance laws, which were
implemented to regulate an important state interest, the motion was barred
by the Younger abstention doctrine, set forth in Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). While that doctrine generally provides
that federal courts should not enjoin pending criminal proceedings, it has
been extended to actions which “implicate a state’s interest in enforcing
the orders and judgments of its courts.” Sprint Communications, Inc.,
v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013). The test for applying
Younger to a civil proceeding states that abstention is required if
the state proceedings are: (1) ongoing (2) implicate “important state
interests,” and (3) provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal
questions. The Ninth Circuit has applied a fourth requirement, that the
federal court action would “enjoin the proceeding or have practical effect
of doing so.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 978 (9th Cir.
2004).Although not mentioned in the Sharma
case, the owner’s action might also have been barred by the Rucker –
Feldman doctrine, which holds that federal courts should not sit in review
of state court decisions unless Congress has specifically authorized such
relief; and the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. §2283, which provides: “A
court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments.”
*Peter A. Davidson is a Partner of Ervin
Cohen & Jessup LLP a Beverly Hills Law Firm. His practice includes
representing Receivers and acting as a Receiver in State and Federal
Court.
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